La comunicación de la verdad ética pasa históricamente por modelos, pero sus propuestas se discuten cuando no favorecen la belleza ética en la persona.El estudio refleja un análisis a modelos éticos en la cultura, para proponer la importancia de enfocar la educación ética valorando los paradigmas de una ética integradora y practica en un currículo global.Se infiere por el relativismo, una dialéctica que permanece sobre las certezas éticas; sobre lo justo, lo bueno, lo verdadero; sobre lo legal y lo ético; (...) para continuar divulgándose un discurso ético no de tipo vinculante, sin despertar pasión por la verdad. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se pretende demostrar que lo sonoro, lo luminoso y lo líquido, como elementos semánticos, son fundamentales para la construcción de lo fantástico y lo sepulcral en la leyenda El miserere de Gustavo Adolfo Bécquer. Estos elementos se interrelacionan por medio del ambiente sepulcral que se presenta en el texto, por medio de metáforas que los vinculan, y por medio de la forma en que se manifiestan en lo posible y lo imposible, cuya unión permite que lo (...) fantástico sea posible. (shrink)

The computer has three fundamental analogies with the human being (senses, memory and intelligence), but the coming out of the data bases announced a new form of language: the computer language. The data bases not only set several new technical and social problems, but moreover are modifying the traditional form of social memory, supported by paper, by changing it in a memory based on electronic means. This situation creates new forms of representation of knowledge to which the author gave attention (...) in previous contributions with his SENECA project, in which computer language tries to give a synthesis of oral and written languages, with their respective advantages. (shrink)

What role could have intrinsic motivation toward reading in an extraordinary situation like the recent confinement? This research examines the relationship between intrinsic reading motivation and reading habits in an adult population considering types of reading, gender, and distress generated by the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. Participants were 3,849 adults from Spain who were surveyed about their reading practices: before, during the first weeks, and after several weeks of confinement. Linear mixed effects models were used to analyze data. Results showed (...) a three-way interaction between reading frequency, IRM, and type of reading. Also, distress seems to pose a differential impact depending on the type of reading. The higher the IRM, the lesser the time devoted to study/work reading and the more to social and news reading. In this sense, IRM can function as a protective factor of reading behavior but only for leisure reading. Results support previous findings of the importance of consciously promoting this type of motivation in all individuals beyond educational contexts, since it seems to be positively related to well-being. Other results and implications are discussed. (shrink)

On the traditional view, Butler maintains that forgiveness involves a kind of “conversion experience” in which we must forswear or let go of our resentment against wrongdoers. Against this reading, I argue that Butler never demands that we forswear resentment but only that we be resentful in the right kind of way. That is, he insists that we should be virtuously resentful, avoiding both too much resentment exhibited by the vices of malice and revenge and too little resentment where we (...) merely condone the wrongdoer and leave ourselves open to future injury. I argue that this Butlerian approach offers us a more attractive account of forgiveness as a “virtue” than many recent discussions. In the final section, I address Butler’s challenging thesis that forgiveness is an unconditional moral duty. I argue against those who claim that forgiveness is supererogatory (Kolnai/Calhoun) or else merely morally conditional and even morally blameworthy in some cases (Murphy/Hampton/Novitz/Richards). By contrast, I defend a context-sensitive account of forgiveness which recognizes that it takes place on many different levels. I conclude by taking up the difficult issue of whether anybody can be ultimately “unforgivable”, offering some Butlerian and Strawsonian reflections that might help mitigate our judgments about such matters. (shrink)

Kant’s metaphilosophy has three main parts: (1) an essentialist project (“What is philosophy?”); (2) a methodological project (“How do we do philosophy?”); and (3) a taxonomic project (“What are the different parts of philosophy, and how are they related?”). This paper focuses on the third project. In particular, it explores one of the most intriguing yet puzzling aspects of Kant’s philosophy, viz. the relationship between what Kant calls ‘pure’ philosophy vs. ‘applied’, ‘empirical’ or what we can broadly refer to as (...) ‘impure’ philosophy. (As we shall see, in order to be able to address this third project, we shall also need to examine the other two projects in detail.) My plan is as follows. First, I discuss four main areas of pure vs. impure philosophy: (i) ‘pure logic’ vs. ‘applied logic’; (ii) ‘rational psychology’ vs. ‘empirical psychology’; (iii) ‘pure metaphysics of nature’ vs. ‘physics’ and (iv) ‘pure morality’ or a ‘metaphysics of morals’ vs. ‘moral anthropology’, ‘practical anthropology’ or ‘applied moral philosophy’. Based on this, I identify four key differences between pure and impure philosophy. Second, I critically examine four different readings of Kant’s views about the status of ‘impure’ philosophy: (a) that it is not genuine philosophy; (b) that it is bad or inferior philosophy; (c) that it is instrumentally valuable; and (d) that it constitutes an indispensable part of Kant’s philosophy, both in a theoretical and practical sense. I argue that Kant is best interpreted as endorsing readings (c) and (d). Third, I offer some concluding remarks. (shrink)

En este trabajo analizamos cómo se articula la justificación estadística de las conclusiones obtenidas en los ensayos clínicos aleatorizados con sus condiciones de aceptabilidad ética y política. Pretendemos mostrar cómo varía tal justificación dependiendo de nuestra concepción de la probabilidad y, correlativamente, qué argumentos éticos se pueden ofrecer sobre cada una de ellas. Veremos cómo los enfoques frecuentista y bayesiano resultan defendibles en el ámbito de los ensayos clínicos y defenderemos que, para su aceptación pública, se les debe exigir garantías (...) de imparcialidad cuyo mejor ejemplo es la propia técnica de aleatorización. /// This paper analyses how to combine the statistical justification of the results obtained in a randomised clinical trial and the ethical and social arguments that support its implementation. It aims at showing how this justification varies according to the view on probability we adopt and the different ethical cases that can be made to sustain it. Both the frequentist and the Bayesian approaches to the design of clinical trials will be seen as equally defensible on these grounds. To be socially acceptable both approaches must meet an impartiality requirement, which is best served by the technique of randomisation. (shrink)

Este artículo expone el resultado de la puesta en práctica de una metodología docente novedosa a través de la que se busca superar las dificultades que el proceso de enseñanza/aprendizaje encuentra en las asignaturas jurídicas que forman parte de los grados universitarios no jurídicos. Comienza destacando el papel que tienen las tecnologías de la información y la comunicación en dicho proceso y, significativamente, el campus virtual. Seguidamente, desgrana cada uno de los elementos de la metodología docente aplicaba, entre los que (...) encuentra la gamificación. Concluye con la determinación de las consecuencias de la experiencia desarrollada. (shrink)

Sovereignty was not only a theory for the proper law of a State but a way of taking away the autonomy of the prophetic spirit and subject to the dialectics of state and government interests. Sovereignty implies that there is no force that operates outside the power capable of regenerating and bring salvation to a people corrupt. Sovereignty involves the creation of a mirage, the manifestation of the free spirit of the people is a product or invention of state power. (...) The homogenization and depersonalization of the people is the result of the struggle to gain freedom and equality, but the intent for this freedom and equality does not entail the collapse of imperial force. (shrink)

Despite the shifting ideologies of gender of the seventeenth century, the arrival of the first actresses caused deep social anxiety: theatre gave women a voice to air grievances and to contest, through their own bodies, traditional gender roles. This paper studies two of the best-known actresses, Nell Gwyn and Anne Bracegirdle, and the different public personae they created to negotiate their presence in this all-male world. In spite of their differing strategies, both women gained fame and profit in the male-dominated (...) theatrical marketplace, confirming them as the ultimate “gender benders,” who appropriated the male role of family’s supporter and bread-winner. (shrink)

La integración del Imperio Otomano y la progresista aparición, en su seno, de estados independientes a lo largo del siglo XIX trajo consigo la inevitable confluencia del espíritu ilustrado-romántico europeo, impulsor de las revoluciones en Europa y América, y el peso de la identidad nacional, arraigada en los esquemas patriarcales tradicionales. En ese exigente proceso de remodelación sociopolítica e ideológica, surgen discursos femeninos que, pese la escasa capacidad de maniobra, sitúan a la mujer en el epicentro del cambio y diseñan (...) una estrategia de lucha feminista.Presentamos dos discursos femeninos, los de la activista griega Kalirroe Parén (1861-1940) y la libanesa-palestina Mayy Ziyada (1866-1941), afincada en Egipto. Ambos se fundamentan en la actividad intelectual y literaria de sus creadoras, en los primeros y sólidos idearios feministas griego y árabe, y en la capacidad política de cambio de la mujer en un entorno hostil. (shrink)

In futsal there are two referees on the playing court and their capacity to respond to physical and physiological demands imposed during the game is essential for the success. The futsal characteristics such as size pitch, referees position and rules of games or type of league could impose specific physical efforts probably. The aim of this study were to analyze the physical demands of eight elite referees from seven matches of Spanish Futsal Cup 2020. The physical activity of each referee (...) during the match was monitored with a Local Positioning System, which was installed on futsal pitch where the matches were played. The data differences were evaluated as Paired-Samples T-Test procedure. The results revealed a similar total distance between halves. The zone 3 distance showed a significative decrease during the match in comparison to the first and second halves. The number of high-intensity acceleration and deceleration decreased in the second half of the match. Therefore, the use of the tracking device to monitoring physical performance provides knowledge of the specific activity profile from futsal referees. This information to can be useful to design more accurate the training programs. (shrink)

Is there any interesting sense in which we can speak of an act as 'evil', in contrast to simply "morally bad' or "immoral"? In ordinary language, we typically judge actions as evil that somehow differ significantly, in terms of degree or intensity, from commonplace wrongdoing. If taken to an extreme, however, this view simply reduces the difference between evil and immoral acts to a mere quantitative analysis. At worst, it leads to a wholly trivial account of evil as just those (...) actions we tend to regard as "really bad". In this paper, I outline a distinctively Kantian theory of evil that instead defends a fundamental qualitative difference between evil and more ordinary immoral actions, locating the main distinction in terms of the structure of the agent's will itself Broadly understood, this strategy endorses a Kantian account of "evil as dehumanization" in which a "material" -- as opposed to purely "formal" -- difference exists between the respective maxims of the immoral and the evil agent. In such instances, unlike typical cases of Kantian immoral actions, direct violation of another person's humanity qua human somehow comprises a necessary part of the "material object" of an evil agent's will. (shrink)

This paper explores the idea of authenticity, both what it is and why it’s valuable. First, I identify and criticize three popular approaches to authenticity: Individual Authenticity, Natural Authenticity, and Truthful Authenticity. Second, I defend a fourth approach to authenticity – what I call Existential Authenticity (EA) – which is comprised of three basic elements: (a) self- understanding, (b) self-expression, and (c) self-concern – in particular, concern about what kind of person one is and what type of life one lead. (...) Third, I explore why EA is valuable in both instrumental and non-instrumental ways. (shrink)

*Runner-up for the 2021 Royal Institute for Philosophy Essay Prize*: What should we think about ‘acts of conscience’, viz., cases where our personal judgments and public authority come into conflict such that principled resistance to the latter seems necessary? Philosophers mainly debate two issues: the Accommodation Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, should public authority accommodate claims of conscience?’ and the Justification Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, are we justified in engaging in acts of conscience – and why?’. By contrast, a (...) third important topic – the Conduct Question, i.e., ‘How should we act, morally speaking, when engaging in acts of conscience?’ – has been mostly neglected. This paper aims to offer concrete guidance for persons wishing to engage in acts of conscience in morally virtuous ways. I argue that such agents are subject to two basic prima facie duties: duties to oneself related to demands of integrity and duties to others related to demands of civility. I explain both duties in detail, arguing with regard to, that in light of what I call ‘the paradox of conscience’, we need to rethink our views about both ‘conscience’ and ‘integrity’; and with regard to, that, building upon Rawls’ ‘duty of civility’, we should embrace at least seven general principles for undertaking acts of conscience in a morally conscientious manner. (shrink)

*Honorable Mention for the 2024 American Association of Philosophy Teachers (AAPT) Lenssen Prize*: In recent years, ‘philosophy as a way of life’ [PWOL] courses have emerged as an exciting new pedagogical approach. I explain what a PWOL-course is. Next, I argue that the standard method for teaching such courses—what I call the ‘Smorgasbord Model’—presents us with a basic problem: viz., the challenge of how to enable students in the context of the modern university to truly experience what a PWOL even (...) is. I propose a solution to this problem by exploring a PWOL that most teachers and students alike already find themselves immersed in, what I describe as political liberalism applied to the university classroom context. I show how this overlooked fact not only offers us a novel resource for teaching PWOL-courses. It also helps philosophy teachers—in a meta-pedagogical sense—to become more self-reflective about and appreciative of our fundamental ethical commitments when teaching philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to synthesize the two most influential contemporary ethical approaches that appeal to moral intuitions, viz., Rawlsian reflective equilibrium and Audi’s moderate intuitionism. This paper has two parts. First, building upon the work of Audi and Gaut, I provide a more detailed and nuanced account of how these two approaches are compatible. Second, I show how this novel synthesis can both (1) fully address the main objections to reflective equilibrium, viz., that it provides neither necessary nor (...) sufficient conditions for the justification of our moral beliefs and (2) help ethical intuitionism to deal with the fundamental problem of peer disagreement over our basic moral intuitions. In doing so, I sketch out a novel and attractive diachronic way of thinking about peer disagreement more generally. (shrink)

In order to make some headway on the debate about whether Kant was a constructivist, nonconstructivist, or instead defends a hybrid view that somehow entirely sidesteps these categories, I attempt to clarify the terms of the debate more carefully than is usually done. First, I discuss the overall relationship between realism and constructivism. Second, I identify four main features of Kantian constructivism in general. Third, I examine three rival versions of metanormative Kantian constructivism, what I’ll call axiological, constitutivist, and rationalist (...) constructivist. I argue that Kant is best seen as a rationalist constructivist. I conclude by arguing that although it’s a constructivist view, this reading avoids the main pitfalls of traditional Kantian constructivism. In doing so, it helps us to achieve a satisfying rapprochement between constructivist and non-constructivist readings of Kant. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a new framework for the general internalism/externalism debate about reasons. My aim is to defend a novel account of internalism that at least allows for the possibility of a more "realist" conception of reasons- thus avoiding simply begging the question (as Williams himself seems to do) against many recent externalist thinkers like Hampton, Scanlon, McDowell, and Parfit - while still somehow retaining a deep connection between reasons to act and an agent's motivations. What is crucial (...) to observe here is that Williams' intemalism relies upon two logically independent premises: on the one hand, a negative "skeptical" thesis denying we have any reason to believe that values - and the reasons associated with them - exist in any realist way independent of individual agents; and on the other hand, a positive "subjectivist" thesis controversially maintaining that all reasons for action are instead in some sense necessarily related to each particular agent's subjective motivations. I think we should reject Williams' widely-disputed "subjectivist" thesis. Rather, by endorsing only Williams' former premise, we are able to formulate a more modest "skeptical" version of intemalism – or what I call ‘skeptical internalism’ – which, unlike Williams' explicitly "subjectivist intemalism", at least allows for the externalist view that values exist in a realist way totally independent of us. We suspend judgment, however, about whether any such values do exist - where significantly, an individual agent's motivations somehow play a constitutive role in terms of assessing what values she even has reason to affirm. Such so-called "skeptical internalism" has several advantages over Williams' own view. As we will see, it not only helps usto bypass the current terminological deadlock, but also allows us to better focus upon what may be the most crucial difference between internalism and extemalism, which rests not so much in how each camp chooses to define what a reason is, but rather in how they understand the nature of rational disagreement itself. This specific worry constitutes perhaps the main crux of the entire intemalist/extemalist debate, and I argue that, in the end, skeptical internalism provides a much more satisfying analysis of the underlying ethical import of such rational disagreement than either of its two main rivals, extemalism or Williams' own subjectivist accountof internalism. (shrink)

Most scholars describe Kant’s idea of dignity as what I term his “vertical” account—that is, our human dignity insofar as we rise above heteronomous natural inclinations and realize human freedom by obeying the moral law. In this paper, I attempt to supplement this traditional view by exploring Kant’s neglected “horizontal” account of dignity—that is, our human dignity insofar as we exist in relationship with others. First, I examine the negative aspect of this horizontal account of dignity, found in Kant’s discussion (...) of public heteronomy perpetuated by unjust social institutions. Second, I explore Kant’s idea of public dignity realized via social interaction: both (1) at the interpersonal level of education and friendship, and (2) at the societal level, in terms of moral education in the public sphere and a communal moral striving towards the highest good. I argue that we cannot realize our full human dignity for Kant outside of the context of concrete social relations with other moral agents. (shrink)

What place, if any, does love have in Kantian ethics? This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I discuss Kant’s own account of moral versus non-moral love as found throughout his various writings and show how this closely parallels his account of moral versus non-moral friendship. Second, I discuss contemporary Kantian accounts of both friendship and love, highlighting how they go beyond, and in some ways seem to significantly improve upon, Kant’s own views via their appeal to Kant’s Formula (...) of Humanity. Lastly, I discuss the overall merits of what I call ‘Kantian moral love’. I argue that while Kantian moral love might rightly identify, from the moral point of view, how we ought to act and think when loving other people, it fails to provide a complete account of love, crucially leaving out certain key elements from the wide range of loving relationships we find ourselves in, especially romantic love. That is, while Kantian moral love might successfully identify a morally ideal way to love other people, it falls short of capturing the full essence of love—mainly because love is not simply a moral affair but also a matter of the heart. (shrink)

En este ensayo abordo la cuestión metafilosófica del concepto de filosofía política. Tras el análisis de algunas alternativas, reconstruyo críticamente la estrategia de conceptualización de Leo Strauss para mostrar su potencial heurístico en el desarrollo de una tipología de la filosofía política. El ensayo se dividirá en tres partes: primero, expongo el problema y analizo algunas alternativas que considero insuficientes para tratar de definir la filosofía política; después, presento la estrategia straussiana de conceptualizarla a partir de la interpretación del significado (...) original de la philosophia; al final, analizo cuatro tipos de filosofía política que identifico en la obra de Strauss y propongo otros dos que se fundamentan en sus propios supuestos. Concluyo señalando la utilidad de esas acepciones como modelos conceptuales para la interpretación, la consideración y la orientación de una filosofía política. (shrink)

Este artículo es un intento de dilucidación y delimitación historiográfico-conceptual que pretende aportar un enfoque alternativo a los estudios sobre la teoría política realista. Mi propósito es presentar un bosquejo del sentido histórico del concepto de realismo político situándolo en los contextos de la Realpolitik alemana y de la escuela realista de las relaciones internacionales. De este modo, pretendo mostrar las relaciones contextuales del realismo político, la localización de su antagonismo con el liberalismo y la invención retrospectiva de una tradición (...) realista como resultado de una serie de apropiaciones intelectuales y políticas. This article is a historiographical and conceptual attempt of clarification and delimitation to offer an alternative view to the studies of the realist political theory. I pretend to put forward an outline of the historical sense of the concept of political realism, placing it on the contexts of German Realpolitik and the realist school of international relations. Thus, I pretend to show the contextual relations of political realism, the location of its antagonism against liberalism and the retrospective invention of a realist tradition as a result of a set of intellectual and political additions. (shrink)

En este trabajo abordaré la discusión contemporánea entre el ecologismo y el animalismo, entendidos como espectros ético-políticos que responden a diversos problemas relacionados con la devastación de los espacios naturales y la sujeción de los animales no humanos. El objetivo es mostrar la tensión entre ambos espectros en el nivel teórico, ético y práctico, algunas propuestas que buscan su convergencia y, finalmente, la posibilidad de un consenso entrecruzado como enfoques críticos del modelo hegemónico de civilización antropocéntrica y especista. Se intentará (...) mostrar también la convergencia necesaria de ambos enfoques críticos con relación a ciertas prácticas que involucran al mismo tiempo la degradación de ecosistemas y la explotación animal. (shrink)

El objetivo general de este ensayo es presentar un mapa con algunas rutas para abordar la cuestión de la agencia de los animales no humanos. La pregunta que se tratará de responder consiste en cómo reconocer y dar cuenta de esa capacidad. Se sugerirán dos opciones principales para ello: una antropomorfista, derivada del modo en que parece haberse estandarizado la cuestión de la agencia; y otra descentrada del humano, desarrollada a partir de algunas vertientes de la crítica filosófica contemporánea. El (...) ensayo se dividirá en cuatro partes: en la primera se plantea el problema de la agencia de los animales no humanos y las posibles formas de responderlo; en la segunda se identificarán dos vías contemporáneas que alimentan el debate acerca del modo adecuado de dar cuenta de la agencia de los animales no humanos; en la tercera se expondrá una postura sobre la importancia teórica y práctica de reconocer la agencia de los animales no humanos: y en la cuarta, finalmente, se desarrolla una reflexión crítica sobre dos fuentes que han operado en el pensamiento moderno para limitar el reconocimiento de esa agencia. (shrink)

En este trabajo ofrecemos un panorama al estudio de los sesgos. El creciente interés en ellos durante las últimas décadas radica en que estudiarlos implica hablar de cómo los seres humanos razonamos y emitimos juicios, e igualmente sobre los mecanismos y procesos que subyacen a tales capacidades, esto incluye entender cuándo y por qué frecuentemente nos equivocamos, como lo indica buena parte de la literatura en psicología cognitiva del razonamiento. Dada la existencia de los sesgos, han surgido posturas pesimistas que (...) sostienen que los sesgos muestran que los humanos son irracionales. Frente a estas, la literatura reciente ofrece visiones mas optimistas, y aduce que los sesgos pueden “desaparecer” si se tienen en consideración diferentes aspectos de tipo evolutivo. Otra postura es aquella que sostienen que la supervivencia humana no yace en la inteligencia individual sino en la colectiva. Es decir, que podemos dejar de confiar exclusivamente en el contenido de nuestra mente y en su lugar resolver los problemas colectivamente, gracias a la división de las tareas cognitivas. Para organizar la exposición dividimos el trabajo en tres enigmas de los sesgos cognitivos. El primero consiste en una discusión sobre el origen de los sesgos. El segundo concierne a su clasificación e inventarios. El tercer enigma versa sobre la unidad de análisis de la cognición humana, a saber, inteligencia individual versus inteligencia colectiva. Con estos enigmas queremos poner de manifiesto el abanico de discusiones que giran alrededor de los sesgos, sus problemas, así como la creciente fascinación por entenderlos. Estudiar los sesgos abona a la comprensión de cómo razonamos o pensamos, y esto nos ayuda a mejorar nuestro pensamiento crítico. (shrink)

In “The Political Dilemmas of Mexico’s Transformations: A Philosophical Approach”, Virginia Aspe explores the character of political transformations in Mexico addressing the following questions: a) What does the notion “political transformation of Mexico” entail? b) What are the philosophical arguments behind the three political transformations that Mexico has experienced since the 19th century? c) What are the political arguments with which the so-called “fourth political transformation” of Mexico is being promoted? Our article offers a series of arguments to begin a (...) conversation on some of the most salient contentions of professor Aspe regarding the phenomenon of political transformation lato sensu and the political transformations that Mexico has undergone, asking ourselves, specifically, if the rise of Obradorism to power can really be incorporated into that theoretical field with which Mexcan political history has been articulated. (shrink)

La responsabilidad por ríesgo no es más que la aplicación de la teoría del riesgo a la responsabilidad civil extracontractual. Como prolegómeno, baste decir que la entrada al mundo jurídico de la teoría del riesgo sirvió para poner en jaque a la dogmática y milenaria culpa como fundamento de la responsabilidad civil, fue el primer criterio objetivo de imputación y sin duda alguna el centro de los más polémicos debates entre los partidarios de la culpa y los partidarios de la (...) responsabilidad civil ausente de toda idea de culpa. La mayoría de la doctrina se refieren a la responsabilidad objetiva o por riesgo, cosa que no es cierta porque el riesgo no es el único criterio objetivo de imputación. (shrink)